Oman's Insurgencies by J. E. Peterson

Author:J. E. Peterson [Peterson, J. E.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General
ISBN: 9780863567025
Google: wkUhBQAAQBAJ
Publisher: Saqi
Published: 2013-01-02T16:07:27+00:00

The Situation at Mid-year

In July 1971, CSAF Brigadier Graham wrote an extensive review of the progress in Dhufar to date. Reiterating the mission he had given to Colonel Mike Harvey when he began as commander of Dhufar at the beginning of 1971 (‘by the end of 1971 to have crippled the Front’s capability of dominating the jabal by military means’), Graham emphasized that it was imperative that substantial military progress be made in Dhufar during the post-monsoon months of 1971, and this meant especially that a permanent presence be established on the Jabal.

Graham proceeded to list the accomplishments achieved in Dhufar to mid-1971:

a.establishment of a miniscule brigade headquarters and base to control and support operations in Dhufar, a definite improvement on the small battalion headquarters of the previous year;

b.the capture of Sadh in March;

c.the enhanced protection of and benefits to the plains and coastal settlements as a result of the efforts of BATT Civil Action Teams;

d.defences created for the protection of contractors’ plant and personnel (allowing the accompaniment of Europeans by their families);

e.imposition of tighter food control in coastal markets, causing shortages of certain foodstuffs among the Front;

f.an increase in the number of SEPs to 261;

g.neutralization of Front cells in Salalah and other coastal towns;

h.the creation from scratch of information media, health, agriculture, education and other services for Dhufar;

i.an estimated ratio of insurgent battle casualties to those of SAF of 5:1;

j.the raising of five firqat with another on the way;

k.establishment of an NFR group with a firqah on the north side of the Jabal;

l.operations carried out to demolish or harass rebel supply routes;

m.satisfactory improvements in morale and combat effectiveness within SAF despite hard fighting, casualties and fatigue; and

n.the failure of the Front to take offensive action against SAF or the civilian population (apart from long-range sniping and fire from 75mm RCLs and mortars), signalling a dramatic improvement from the previous year; furthermore, the insertion of NFR at Akut had attracted a useful share of insurgent ammunition which otherwise might have been directed against RAF Salalah or other vulnerable points.

At the same time, Graham noted three areas in which the SAF had not been able to make much headway. First, the recruitment of Dhufaris into the DG had been extremely disappointing, leaving the DG at only half-strength and limiting the MR largely to static defence of Salalah Plain (there was reasonable expectation that the proposed Baluch ‘Askar Force would help, however). Second, the Front’s standard of leadership and weapon handling had shown a marked improvement, partly because of practice and partly due to the return of men from overseas training and from the ranks of the TOS. Against this, however, harsh treatment of the population had caused many to seek sanctuary on the SAF-controlled plain. Third, the SAF still had not been able to establish a permanent base on the Jabal because of the delay in the delivery of AB-205 helicopters, the paucity of logistic support and infantry, obvious weaknesses in the firqat and the inability of the DG to relieve the MR of its plains defence commitment.

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